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Abstract
We investigated children’s ability to generate associations and how automaticity of associative
activation unfolds developmentally.  Children generated associative responses using a single-
(Experiment 1) or a DRM-like multiple-associates paradigm (Experiment 2).  The results
indicated that children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates, and the automaticity with
which they were generated, increased between the ages of 5, 7, and 11 years.  These findings
suggest that children’s domain-specific knowledge base and the associative connections among
related concepts are present and continue to develop from a very early age.  Moreover, there is an
increase in how automatically these concepts are activated with age, something that results from
domain general developments in speed of processing.  These changes are consistent with the
neurodevelopmental literature and together, may provide a more complete explanation of the
development of memory illusions.
Keywords:   implicit associative responses; automatic processes; false memory
development; associative-activation theory; source-monitoring
The Development of Automatic Associative Processes and Children’s False Memories
A well-established finding in the literature on children’s memory is that younger children
are frequently more susceptible to misinformation effects than older children and adults.  This age
effect has been reliably shown in studies that have used suggestibility or misinformation
manipulations in order to taint children’s memories (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987).  Thus, the
message from suggestibility research is that false memories decrease with age in childhood.
In contrast, over the past years, studies that have implemented the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), have shown that
children’s spontaneous false memories increase with age (Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna,
2006; Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007; Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Howe, Wimmer, &
Blease, 2009a).  In the DRM paradigm participants study lists of words that are all associated with
a non-presented word, the “critical lure”.  For example, “hot”, “snow”, “warm”, “winter”, “ice”,
and so forth, are all associated with the critical lure, “cold”.  Despite never hearing the word
“cold”, participants falsely recollect “cold” along with correctly remembering list items that were
presented.
What the findings from these different paradigms reveal is that there exists one set of
conditions under which false memories increase with age (DRM paradigm) and another set of
conditions under which false memories decrease with age (suggestibility paradigm).  A recent
study by Ceci, Papierno, and Kulkofsky (2007) may provide some insight into why these different
trends have emerged across these two paradigms.  They investigated how 4- and 9-year-old
children’s individual associations for concepts influenced their suggestibility.  Specifically, when
a suggested distractor is judged to be strongly associated to an original item’s representation (and
these judgements differed between 4- and 9-year-olds), children’s susceptibility to misinformation
increased compared to when that information was less strongly associated, regardless of age.
Apparently, there is an important relation between knowledge representation that is age dependent
and suggestibility.  That is, suggestibility is greater when it is mapped onto age-appropriate
knowledge representations and the task encourages associative processing.  What these results
suggest is that the discrepancy between the findings for suggestibility and spontaneous false
memories may be more apparent than real.  Indeed, studies to date seem to show that at least one
hallmark of children’s false memories is the (often spontaneous) formation of associations and
that the nature of these associations changes with age.  In order to extend this line of inquiry and
study these underlying associative processes in greater detail, we adopted a DRM-like procedure,
as this has quickly become the sine qua non for research on associative processing in both
children and adults (see Gallo, 2006).
One problem with using the DRM paradigm in child research is that the word lists that are
typically used are those derived from adult word association norms (e.g., Nelson, McEvoy, &
Schreiber, 1999).  Research on children’s memory organization, like that just reviewed (Ceci et
al., 2007), suggests that although associative links between concepts appear at a relatively young
age, they are further strengthened and refined with increases in both knowledge and experience
(Bjorklund, 1987, 2005).  Because children’s knowledge base is different from adults’, using adult
normed word lists may explain why children have fewer false memories than adults.
Recently, three studies addressed this issue and used children’s associations to construct
word lists (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007;
Metzger, Warren, Shelton, Price, Reed, & Williams, 2008).  Interestingly, all three studies found
that although developmental trends were considerably attenuated, false memories still tended to
increase with age.  These findings suggest that the increase in false memories with age cannot be
attributed solely to changes in the content or organization of children’s knowledge base.  Rather,
as suggested in the Associative-activation theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton,
2009b), it is likely that these additional increases in false memory rates with age are due to
increases in children’s ability to automatically activate and use associative relations much in the
same way as adults (Kimball & Bjork, 2002).  In particular, AAT suggests that false memory
development is the result of increases in the number and strength of associative relations in
children’s knowledge base as well as the speed and automaticity with which these associative
relations are accessed and activated.
An alternative theory, Fuzzy-trace-theory (FTT; e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008),
suggests that children’s memory is organized by two different memory traces: a verbatim and a
gist trace.  Verbatim traces encode surface features of items such as, for example, the
phonological structure of a word.  Gist traces encode the meaning or overall theme of a word or
list of words.  Children’s false memories increase with age because gist extraction processes
improve with age.  The difference between the two theories is that FTT explains age increases in
false memories in terms of coincident changes in gist extraction whereas AAT explains these
same changes in terms of increases in the number and speed of direct activation processes among
items in a semantic network.
Both AAT and FTT agree that for false memories to occur it is necessary to have a pre-
existing lexicon of associations and this lexicon needs to be activated mentally (see also Gallo,
2006 for a more in depth discussion).  Somewhat surprisingly, despite this agreement, there is
little research on how children’s ability to form spontaneous associations develops.  The current
research aims to shed more light on this.  Specifically, in two experiments, we examine the
development of both number and type of word associations and their interconnections in
children’s lexicons and the automaticity with which these items are accessed.
It has been demonstrated that children’s false memories are produced less automatically
than adults’ (Howe, 2005).  That is, when instructed to “forget” items that have been studied, both
children’s and adults’ true memories decrease.  In contrast, for false memories, only children’s but
not adults’ decreased in comparison to a control condition with no instructions (Howe, 2005;
Kimball & Bjork, 2002).  Thus, when using a directed forgetting paradigm, although both children
and adults can suppress true memories, only children seem to be able to suppress false memories.
This lack of inhibition in adults’ false memories in a directed forgetting paradigm, suggests that
they are generated more automatically outside of conscious awareness.  For children, these items,
like items on the studied list itself, can be inhibited and appear to be treated as if they are part of
the episodic list.  To date, however, only Howe (2005) has investigated age differences in the
automaticity of false memory generation and even this study was restricted to a single component
of automaticity, namely response inhibition.  Because little is known about the automaticity of
children’s associations, or how they come to automatically access and activate concepts in
memory, the purpose of the current research is to investigate these developments in 5-, 7-, and 11-
year-olds.  To be precise, we examine a different aspect of automaticity than that studied by Howe
(2005), namely, age changes in the speed with which children can generate associative responses.
Here, we use speed of processing of an associative response as an index of automaticity.  In
particular, if the knowledge representation of an association is strong, then associative activation
will be less effortful and faster.  Less effortful and faster processing indicates automaticity.
Therefore, for the purposes of the current research, we use speed of processing as an index of
automaticity.
The study of age changes in speed-of-processing is well motivated from other areas of
research with children, namely, the finding that children’s automaticity in solving cognitive tasks
increases with age.  For example, children’s increase in processing speed on a variety of cognitive
tasks (e.g., visual and memory search, mental rotation, mental addition) has been described by a
single exponential function (Kail, 1988).  This finding suggests that although the development of
specific areas of knowledge may be a domain-specific characteristic of children’s memory
development, changes in speed of processing may be a more domain-general development, one
that affects all areas of children’s cognitive processing including memory and, potentially, false
recollection.  However, the question arises, how the development of both is connected.  That is,
studies that have examined false memory development have either addressed the issue of
knowledge base (e.g., Howe et al., 2009b; Metzger et al., 2008) or of automaticity (e.g., Howe,
2005), but never both simultaneously.
            An exception to this is an early study by Hall (1969) that gives an indication of how
children’s associative processes develop in relation to knowledge base and automaticity.  He
found that 6- and 9-year-old children have more difficulties correctly recognizing word associates
that have been produced by themselves than recognizing words that have been produced by
another person.  This lack of memory advantage for the involvement of the self stands in contrast
to an extensive literature that suggests an increased accuracy of remembering self-generated
events (e.g., actions and thoughts) in comparison to external-generated events (Foley, Johnson, &
Raye, 1983; Roberts & Blades, 2005).  How can this discrepancy be explained?  These
inconsistent findings of a memory advantage for the self versus a memory disadvantage for the
self, suggest that these responses are generated in a qualitatively different fashion.  Specifically,
Hall’s (1969) finding that self-produced word associates are less well remembered suggests that
they may be less conscious than ones generated by others.  They may be less conscious because
they may have been generated automatically based on a child’s pre-existing knowledge base and
the links among associations.  Underwood (1965) used the phrase implicit associative responses
(IARs) to describe the pattern of associations generated spontaneously by participants in response
to words that have been presented.
Interestingly, Hall (1969) also demonstrated that with development, children get better at
discriminating whether information was self-generated or generated by another person.
Discriminating whether information is self- or other-generated is a form of source monitoring –
the ability to distinguish between memories based on the origin or source of those memories
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  There is a large body of evidence showing that
children’s discrimination of internally versus externally generated actions and words increases
with age (Foley, Durso, Wilder, & Friedman, 1991; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley, et al., 1983;
Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Roberts & Blades, 1998).  Source monitoring errors can also be
a source of false memories in adults.  In particular, source monitoring has been embedded in the
Activation-monitoring theory of false recollection in adults (AMT; Roediger, Balota, & Watson,
2001).  Like AAT, AMT views false memories as a product of spreading associative activation
processes.  Unlike AAT, AMT also states that for adults whose source monitoring skills are better
developed than children’s, false memories occur because of source-monitoring errors.
Specifically, false memories occur because participants cannot determine the source of the critical
lure – whether it has been generated internally or was part of the episodic list.  In fact, adult
participants frequently believe that they accurately remember that a critical lure had been
presented and do so with a high degree of confidence (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
Unfortunately, a source-monitoring explanation cannot account for children’s increase in false
memories with age because it would lead to the prediction that younger children should have more
false memories than older children because they have poorer source-monitoring skills (Johnson et
al., 1993).
However, there may be conditions under which source-monitoring errors can explain
children’s increase in false memories with age.  In particular, in conditions under which the
spontaneous formation of associations is encouraged, as in the DRM paradigm, and where this
association formation is derived from automatic processes, a correct source judgement may be
more difficult.  That is, if a “false” association is formed spontaneously then it may become part
of the studied associative information and cannot be distinguished from non-presented
information.  Further, if false memories are generated more automatically with age, then the
greater the automaticity, the more difficult a source judgment may be, resulting in a
developmental reversal of source-monitoring abilities.  We investigated this possibility in the
current research.  Specifically, we were interested in children’s developing ability to discriminate
self- from other-generated information when information is derived from either automatic or
conscious associative processes.  Moreover, we were interested in whether source confusions, like
those observed in adults’ false memories, can explain the increase in the number of false
memories with age in childhood when those memories are generated automatically.
In sum, there are several processes that develop over childhood and their interplay may
contribute to false memory formation: reorganization of knowledge, speed of processing, and
source-monitoring developments.  The aim of the current research was to shed more light onto the
development of these processes, their interplay, and their relation to developmental increases in
false memories.  To do this, we used a word association task in Experiment 1 to investigate the
development of children’s spontaneous associative processes based on pre-existing knowledge.  In
Experiment 2 we investigated how children form associations between multiple word associates in
a DRM-like paradigm.  The crucial questions concerning children’s spontaneous associations
were (a) how does children’s knowledge organization change with age, (b) how are spontaneous
associations formed or activated when they are encouraged, and (c) does the automaticity of
children’s associative connections increase with age?  In both experiments, we investigated how
the speed of associative responses increased with age by measuring the time it took each child to
generate their own word associations from their own knowledge base.
In addition, we were interested in how the development of associative representations and
their activation relates to source-monitoring development and to false memories.  The key
question concerning source monitoring was whether we find increasing automatic processing with
age is correlated with increasing difficultly judging the source of information in memory.  In order
to investigate this question, across both experiments we explored children’s ability to discriminate
the source of generated information (self versus other) as a function of whether that information is
generated consciously or automatically.  Investigating the development of implicit associative
processes, the speed with which these associations are generated, and source-monitoring
developments, as well as their relation to false memories, allows us to gain more insight into how
these processes develop in isolation, in combination, and document their relevance for
developmental increases in false memories.
Experiment 1
We used Hall’s (1969) paradigm with slight modifications in order to investigate the
development of implicit associative responses, their automaticity, and children’s ability to
discriminate the source of associations.  We included a broader age range, 5-, 7-, and 11-year-
olds, and used a two-step response mode.  Children were given a word and asked to provide the
first word that came to mind.  We were interested in what type of responses children across
different ages would make (i.e., meaningful word associates versus non-meaningful responses).
In addition, we explored whether there was a syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift in children’s
responses (see Nelson, 1977, for an overview).  Syntagmatic refers to words from different
grammatical classes that appear together in discourse (e.g., dog – bark) whereas paradigmatic
refers to words from the same grammatical class (e.g., dog – cat).  The time of occurrence of this
shift is around the age 5-9.  Specifically, in word association tasks, younger children are more
likely to give syntagmatic responses in comparison to older children and adults who are more
likely to give paradigmatic responses (Cronin, 2002)1.
Our measure of automaticity was the time it took for the child to produce each association.
 The cue words given by the experimenter (other-generated items), the words produced by the
child (self-generated items), and new items were then presented on a recognition test and children
had to judge whether the words were old or new.  If a word was judged old, children were
required to state the source of information (self vs. other).  This design allows making a
distinction between recognition and discrimination.  In particular, a recognition judgement
(judging that an item had been represented) can be made without identifying the source of
information.  Therefore, in the following recognition paradigm we used a two-step response
mode.
Method
            Participants
A total of 106 children (61% female) participated in this experiment, 40 5-year-olds (M =
5.2, SD = 4 months), 31 7-year-olds (M = 7.4, SD = 6 months), and 35 11-year-olds (M = 11.3,
SD = 6 months).  All children (predominantly White and working class) were tested following
parental consent and their own assent on the day of testing.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases: production, distractor, and recognition.  In the
production phase, children were presented with 20 different words (other-generated words), one at
a time in random order, and asked to produce the first word that came to mind (self-generated
words).  The 20 different words were child friendly, high word-frequency nouns, verbs, and
adjectives (e.g., rabbit, wash, long) (word frequency values were obtained from Stuart, Masterson,
Dixon, & Quinlan, 1993-1996) that were not directly associated with each other2.  Children were
instructed that they would be orally presented with a word and their task was to state another
associated word (i.e., “I am going to say a word and I want you to say the first word that comes to
your mind.  For example, if I say “doctor” you could say “nurse” because they both work in a
hospital or if I say “cow” you could say “milk” because cows give milk).  This explicit instruction
was necessary in order to prevent children from answering randomly rather than trying to generate
word associates.  Children first received three practise words (bread, TV, school), unrelated to the
following 20 words, in order to familiarize them with the presentation-answer procedure.  The
first 31 children (10 5-year-olds; 11 7-year-olds; 10 11-year-olds) received words presented orally
by the experimenter and no reaction times were recorded.  The remaining 75 children received a
computerized version of the task in order to measure reaction times.  Out of these, 38 children saw
a video of the female experimenter and 37 children of another female orally presenting 20 items.
This manipulation was implemented in order to explore whether having the same person at
presentation and at test (female experimenter) increased correct recognition in comparison to
having a different person at presentation (another female) and at test (experimenter).  After each
word presentation, the duration between stimulus-word offset and the child’s word generation was
measured via a button press with the right index finger of the experimenter.  After word
production, children received a 3½-minute distractor task (visual search game “Where is
Walley?”).  They then received a 60-item recognition task presented orally by the experimenter3.
Here 20 items were stimulus words (other-generated items), 20 were response words (self-
generated items), and 20 were new words unrelated to the presented or generated words.  Children
were instructed to say “yes” if the word appeared before (either self-generated or other-generated)
and “no” if no one said the word before.  If children responded “yes” to a word, they would then
have to indicate the source of information: experimenter/second female presenter (other) or
themselves (self).
Results
There were no performance differences when having the same person at item presentation
and at test in comparison to having a different person at presentation and at test.  Therefore, we
combined both conditions into one analysis.
Word association task: Generation time analysis and type of word associates
In order to investigate the automaticity of word associates we analyzed how long children
took to generate word associates.  Initially, outliers (2 standard deviations from the mean) were
removed from the analysis.  Children’s generation time of word associations increased
significantly in speed with age, F(2, 74) = 50.00, p < .001, ?p² = .58.  Post-hoc Bonferroni
comparisons (p < .001) indicated that 5-year-olds (M = 3.52) took longer to generate word
associations than 7-year-olds (M = 2.56) who took longer than 11-year-olds (M = 1.18).
Although this is a clear developmental trend, one might argue that children’s decrease in
reaction time with age is simply an artifact of age differences in the types of associative responses
generated by children of different ages.  That is, younger but not older children frequently
generate irrelevant, rather than meaningful, responses to cue words.  In order to exclude this
possibility, we next analyzed only the generation times of children’s meaningful responses.  Two
raters decided whether a child’s response was a meaningful associate of the stimulus.  A
meaningful response was defined as any word that can be associated to the stimulus word on any
relational dimension (i.e., taxonomy, synonymy, antonymy, entity, introspective, situational).
Inter-rater reliability was high, 86%, Cohen’s Kappa coefficient = .76.  Disagreements were
resolved through discussion.
Our first question was whether there were age differences in the number of meaningful
word associations produced.  Indeed, an ANOVA with the proportion of meaningful word
associations generated as the dependent variable and the 3 age groups as a between-subjects factor
showed a main effect for age, F(2, 72) = 14.51, p < .001, ?p² = .29.  Post-hoc Bonferroni
comparisons (p < .001) indicated that 5-year-olds (M = .83) produced fewer meaningful word
associates than both 7-year-olds (M = .96) and 11-year-olds (M = .98), where the latter two age
groups did not differ.
Further, we explored what type of word associates children generated out of these
meaningful associates: syntagmatic (words from different grammatical classes, e.g., dog-bark)
versus paradigmatic (words from the same grammatical class, e.g., dog-cat).  An ANOVA with
the two response types (syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic) as a within-subject factor and the three age
groups as the between-subjects factor revealed a main effect for response type, F(1, 72) = 88.95,
p < .001, ?p² = .55, where children produced more paradigmatic word associates than syntagmatic
ones.  Interestingly, there was an Age x Response type interaction, F(2, 72) = 7.62, p = .001, ?p² =
.18.  As confirmed by post-hoc tests, although 5-year-olds generated more paradigmatic responses
than syntagmatic ones (p = .002), the difference in the amount of syntagmatic versus paradigmatic
responses increased with age such that 11-year-olds (p < .001) produced mostly paradigmatic
responses (Table 1).
Second, because of these age differences in meaningful responses, it was necessary to
analyze generation times of only the meaningful word associates.  An ANOVA with the
generation times of meaningful associates as dependent variable and the 3 age groups as a
between-subjects factor revealed a main effect for age, F(2, 72) = 46.47, p < .001, ?p² = .56.  Post-
hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated that 5-year-olds (M = 3.40) generated meaningful
associates more slowly than 7-year-olds (M = 2.51, p = .002) and both of these age groups were
slower than 11-year-olds (M = 1.16, p < .001) (Table 2).  Thus, whereas overall 11- and 7-year-
olds produced more meaningful word associates than 5-year-olds, the production of these
meaningful associates was slower for 5- than for 7-year-olds and both of these age groups were
slower than 11-year-olds.
Correct Recognition
As expected, children’s correct recognition increased with age (left panel of Figure 1):
F(2, 103) = 35.06, p < .001, ?p² = .41.  Bonferroni planned comparisons (p < .001) indicated that 5-
year-olds (M = .70) correctly recognized fewer items than 7-year-olds (M = .80) and 11-year-olds
(M = .89), and the latter two groups also differed.
In order to control for response bias the signal detection method for computing A(
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) was used.  A value of 0.5 indicates an absence of true recognition
(low accuracy – no higher acceptance rates for correct items than for unrelated distractors).  A
value of 1 indicates perfect true (high accuracy) recognition.  When the analyses were based on A(
scores, children’s correct recognition increased with age, F(2, 103) = 38.50, p < .001, ?p² = .43.
Bonferroni planned adjacent age groups’ comparisons showed that 11-year-olds (M = .97) had
almost similar levels of correct recognition as 7-year-olds (M = .94, p = .083) who recognized
more than 5-year-olds (M = .85, p < .001).  Overall, all A( scores were close to 1 indicating high
accuracy across all ages.
Correct Recognition and Source Attribution (Self vs. Other)
First, we were interested in whether children correctly recognized self- and other-
generated words and if so, whether they were able to indicate the source of generation (self v.
other).  Children’s source attributions to correctly recognized items were analyzed using a 3(Age:
5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds) x 2(Source: self-generated vs. other-generated items) mixed ANOVA,
where age was a between-subjects factor and source a within-subject factor.  The results showed a
main effect for source, F(1, 103) = 75.00, p < .001, ?p² = .42, where fewer self-generated items
(M = .61) were correctly attributed than other-generated items (M = .80).  There was also a main
effect for age, F(2, 103) = 64.39, p < .001, ?p² = .56.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons (p < .001)
showed that 5-year-olds (M = .54) correctly attributed fewer items than 7-year-olds (M = .71) who
correctly attributed fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .86) but the latter comparison was not
reliable.  Finally, there was an Age x Source interaction, F(2, 103) = 5.10, p = .008, ?p² = .09.  As
confirmed by post-hoc tests, the difference between correct self- and other-generated attributions
decreased with age but was still significant at age 11 (p < .05) (right-panel of Figure 1).
Source-monitoring: Overestimation of Self- and Other-generated Responses
We were also interested in children’s source-monitoring errors.  For example, how many
items that were judged to be produced by themselves were in reality produced by the other and
vice versa?  A 3(Age: 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds) x 2(Overestimation type: self/other [items
attributed to self that were in reality other generated] vs. other/self [items attributed to other that
were in reality generated by themselves]) ANOVA was conducted.  The results showed a main
effect for overestimation type (Table 3), F(1, 103) = 5.45, p = .002, ?p² = .05, where children
overestimated fewer self (M = .09) than other responses (M = .13). There was a main effect for
age, F(2, 103) = 21.65, p < .001, ?p² = .30.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons show that 5-year-
olds (M = .19) overestimated more items than 7-year-olds (M = .10, p = .001) who overestimated
more items than 11-year-olds (M = .04, p = .062).  Thus, there was a stronger tendency to
misjudge items to be produced by others that were in reality self-generated, especially for the
younger children.  However, overall these source confusions were very low even for 5-year-olds.
Discussion
Experiment 1 produced two key results.  First, as shown in the word association task,
children’s lexicon of associations increases significantly in number between the ages of 5, 7, and
11 years of age.  Further, also the types of associations produced changed with age.  That is,
although children across all age groups produced more paradigmatic than syntagmatic associates,
11-year-olds made very few syntagmatic responses.  This change in type of associative response
with age demonstrates a reorganization of existing knowledge (Nelson, 1977).
Second, the automaticity with which these associates are activated also increased with age.
 Specifically, across all three age groups, children were better at recognizing and identifying the
source of information for items that were generated by another person in contrast to self-generated
items and this difference decreased with age.  Our findings agree with those obtained by Hall
(1969) but stand in marked contrast to the usual finding of a memory advantage for the self (e.g.,
Foley, et al., 1983; Roberts & Blades, 2005).  Perhaps these discrepant findings indicate that self-
generated responses involve qualitatively different processes across different tasks and studies.  In
particular, the current finding that self-generated responses were less well remembered suggests
that these responses occurred more automatically and outside of children’s conscious awareness.
Less conscious awareness implies lower level of processing, something that in turn, implies that
these responses were generated relatively automatically.  Thus, these current self-generated
responses are implicit associative responses - implicit in the sense that they are derived from one’s
own pre-existing lexicon about concepts and the associative links between those concepts.  Self-
generated information based on implicit associative responses is qualitatively different from self-
generated responses based on conscious processes, such as those generated in studies that
explicitly instructed children to, for example, perform an action.  The current finding that across
all three age groups the memory advantage for the self disappears suggests that these implicit
associative responses are already fairly automatic even by 5 years of age.
Moreover, direct evidence for an increase in automaticity of associative concepts with age
comes from the generation time analysis.  Here, the speed with which word associates were
generated increased significantly with age.  Specifically, 11-year-olds were significantly faster in
generating word associates than 5- and 7-year-olds.  Interestingly, although the 7-year-olds were
slower than the 11-year-olds, they generated similar amounts of meaningful associative responses.
 This finding suggests that there is a trade-off at 7 years between knowledge and automaticity.
That is, in this paradigm, although 7-year-olds’ knowledge base of associations is comparable to
11-year-olds, their associative links between concepts are not activated as automatically as they
are for 11-year-olds.
In addition, children’s discrimination between self- and other-generated information
(source-monitoring) increased significantly with age.  This finding is consistent with the source-
monitoring literature that suggests that 6-year-old children are already very good at discriminating
between externally versus internally generated information and actions (e.g., Foley, et al., 1983;
Johnson, et al., 1993).  Overall, source confusions were very low, even for our youngest age
group, 5-year-olds.  However, when source confusions occurred, there was a stronger tendency to
misjudge items as having been produced by others, responses that were in reality self-generated,
and this was especially true for the younger children.  This latter result contrasts with findings
from Foley and colleagues (Foley, Passalacqua, & Ratner, 1993) who demonstrated that younger
children are more likely to state that an action has been self-performed when in reality, it had been
other-performed than vice versa.  The difference in findings from Foley et al.’s (1993) study and
the current experiment may again be explained by different levels of processing involved:
conscious explicitly performed actions (Foley et al., 1993) versus automatic implicit responses
(current experiment).
In sum, under conditions in which associative processing is encouraged and generated
internally, as in the current word association task, the memory advantage for the self disappears
and the self is less likely to be judged as a source of information.  Critically, these results are key
to explaining the development of false memory illusions because the DRM paradigm represents
one of those conditions in which associative processing is encouraged.  Therefore, it is possible
that the disappearance of the memory advantage for the self may partly accounts for the
developmental increase in false memory generation that results from internally generated
associative processes.
The question remains as to how changes in automaticity translates into increases in
children’s false memory rates with age, a question we address next in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
            In the previous experiment we focused on implicit associative responses to single words.
In Experiment 2, we investigated how children form associations between multiple word
associates and examine their relation to false memories.  By using a modified DRM paradigm we
explored what kind of responses children generated immediately after being presented with a list
of word associates.  The critical question was whether children would spontaneously produce the
critical lure (i.e., the strongest associate) and whether this was more likely to occur for older
children who are more likely to generate false memories.  As in Experiment 1, we investigated
how automatically these associates were generated and how well children discriminate the source
(self or other) of presented and generated associates.
A critical question in this experiment was whether children’s self-generated associates
become part of the episodic list making them more difficult for children to distinguish them from
the list members.  Older children whose associative processes are more automatic may have
particular difficulties making correct judgements about the source of information (self vs. other)
resulting in more frequent source-monitoring errors.  Indeed, this may explain why older children
are more likely to produce false memories.
Method
Participants
A total of 65 children (62% female) participated in this experiment, 19 5-year-olds (M =
5.1, SD = 3 months), 25 7-year-olds (M = 7.2, SD = 3 months), and 21 11-year-olds (M = 11.1,
SD = 4 months).  All children (predominantly White and working class) were tested following
parental consent and their own assent on the day of testing.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
All children received a DRM word production task first and then a recognition test.
Children were presented orally with 10 5-item DRM lists (Black, Sleep, Mountain, Car, Soft,
Lion, Cold, Fruit, Shirt, Foot) with the lure’s strongest backward associate removed (as we
explain later, the strongest backward associate was used only in the recognition test) (see
Appendix).  The lists were obtained from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) and
were chosen according to their total backward associative strength (BAS) to the critical lure.  It
was important to have lists that were relatively high in BAS in order to increase the likelihood of
eliciting the critical lure.  The lists comprised the 2nd to 6th strongest associates of each critical lure
and were presented via a video of a female presenter on a computer screen, as in Experiment 1.
In the word production paradigm children were instructed that they would be presented
with a list of words and, in contrast to Experiment 1 where children were explicitly instructed to
generate word associates, children were explicitly instructed to generate the first word that came
to their mind.  This instruction was necessary in order to explore whether the presentation of 5-
item DRM lists spontaneously elicits the critical lure.
First, children received two practice lists (i.e., high, bread) that were not associated with
the 10 DRM lists that followed in order to familiarize them with the procedure.  Next, children
were presented with the first 5-item list (other-generated items) and asked to generate the first
word that came to mind (self-generated items).  There were four possible outcomes for children’s
answers: (1) children could generate the unpresented critical lure, (2) children could generate the
unpresented strongest associate that was removed from the list, (3) children could generate a
related item that was not part of the list, or (4) children could generate an unrelated item that was
not associated to the presented items.  As in Experiment 1, children’s generation time was
measured between the offset of the last list item and the onset of their own associate.  Children’s
answers were written down and used in the later recognition task; as before, answers varied from
child to child.  This procedure was continued for the remaining 9 of the total 10 lists.
After a 3½-minute distractor task (“Where is Walley?”), all children received a 60-item
recognition task presented orally by the experimenter.  This included the10 self-generated items,
10 critical lures (if a child generated the critical lure in the word-production paradigm it was
replaced with the unpresented strongest associate), 10 weakly related but unpresented items, and
30 correct list items.  Children had to say “yes” if the word appeared before (either self-generated
or other-generated) and “no” if the word had not been presented before.  If children responded
“yes” they had to indicate the source of information (self vs. other).
Results
We begin by examining age differences in the number of critical lures, strongest
associates, related items, and unrelated items produced during the generation task.  We follow this
by examining age differences in generation times.  Finally we examine differences in the
subsequent recognition task including source identification.
Age Differences in Item Generation
Critical Lures
The proportion of critical lures produced increased with age, F(2, 62) = 11.61, p < .001,
?p² = .27.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent age groups indicated that 5-year-olds
(M = .11) produced fewer critical lures than 7-year-olds (M = .20), although not significantly
more, and 7-year-olds produced fewer lures than 11-year-olds (M = .38, p = .003) (Figure 2).
Strongest Associates
Almost none of the strongest associates to the critical lure were produced and this was the
case for all age groups, 5-year-olds (M = .005), 7-year-olds (M = .006), and 11-year-olds (M =
.007) (Figure 2).
Related Items
Like critical lures, the proportion of related items produced increased with age, F(2, 62) =
6.97, p = .002, ?p² = .18.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent age groups indicated that 5-
year-olds (M = .28) produced fewer related items than 7-year-olds (M = .50, p = .01) who
produced similar amounts of related items as 11-year-olds (M = .53) (Figure 2).
Unrelated Items
In contrast, the amount of unrelated items produced decreased with age, F(2, 62) = 19.58,
p < .001, ?p² = .39.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent age groups indicated that 5-year-
olds (M = .61) produced more unrelated items than 7-year-olds (M = .30, p = .001) who produced
more unrelated items than 11-year-olds (M = .07, p = .02) (Figure 2).  Thus, younger children
spontaneously generated considerably fewer meaningful items than older children.
Generation Time Analyses
Here, we were interested in how long children took to generate an item.  As in Experiment
1, outliers (2 standard deviations from the mean) were removed from the analysis.  Next, we
divided answers into meaningful associations produced (either critical lures, strongest associates,
or related items) versus non-meaningful associations produced.  Children’s time to produce
meaningful associations decreased significantly with age, F(2, 57) = 6.83, p = .002, ?p² = .19.
Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicated that 5-year-olds (M = 4.11) did not differ in time to
generate meaningful word associations to 7-year-olds (M = 3.28), but both age groups took longer
than 11-year-olds (M = 1.48, p = .032) 4.  In contrast, an analysis of the non-meaningful items that
were produced did not reveal an age effect, F < 1 (Table 4).  Thus, there was no age effect in
generation times for non-meaningful associates but a significant effect for meaningful word
associates.  This dissociation suggests that older children are not faster per se.  Rather, this effect
is specific to the generation of meaningful word associates, something that is more automatic in
older than younger children.
Age Differences in Recognition
Correct Recognition Other-generated Items
First, we analyzed correct recognition of other-generated items.  An ANOVA with correct
recognition of other-generated items as dependent variable and age group as the between-subjects
factor indicated that children’s correct recognition of presented items increased with age, F(2, 62)
= 11.91, p < .001, ?p² = .29.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent age groups indicated
that 5-year-olds (M = .52) recognized fewer items than 7-year-olds (M = .68, p = .011) who had
similar levels of recognition as 11-year-olds (M = .78).  Further, source errors (judging that
children themselves generated the item) were very low for all ages: 5-year-olds (M = .02), 7-year-
olds (M = .02), and 11-year-olds (M = .004).  
False Recognition of Critical Lures and Strongest Associates
In contrast to correct recognition, analyses of children’s false recognition of critical lures
combined with the strongest associates showed no age effects5 (5-year-olds: M = .43; 7-year-olds:
M = .51; 11-year-olds: M = .46).  The same results were obtained when analyzing A( scores (5-
year-olds: M = .71; 7-year-olds: M = .76; 11-year-olds: M = .73).  However, when we analysed
only false alarms to critical lures based on the number of critical lures that were given to each
participant we found the expected age increase in false memories that was approaching
significance; F(2, 62) = 2.73, p = .073, ?p² = .08.  Bonferroni adjacent age groups’ planned
comparisons (p = .048) indicated that 5-year-olds (M = .43) had fewer false alarms to critical lures
than 7-year-olds (M = .60) who in turn did not differ from 11-year-olds (M = .61).  Further, if
children falsely judged the critical lure or strongest associate to have been presented, they were
more likely to judge that the item was part of the list than self-generated, F(1, 62) = 718.42, p <
.001, ?p² = .92.  There was no effect for age and no interaction.
Correct Recognition Self-generated Items
Next, we were interested in how well children recognized items that were self-generated.
Children’s recognition of self-generated items increased significantly with age, F(2, 62) = 14.00,
p < .001, ?p² = .31.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent age groups indicated that 5-year-
olds (M = .67) recognized similar amounts of self-generated items as 7-year-olds (M = .76) both
of whom recognized fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .91, p = .002) (Table 5).  Further, source
errors (judging the item as other-generated) were fairly low for all ages: 5-year-olds (M = .31), 7-
year-olds (M = .18), and 11-year-olds (M = .22) and none of these differences were reliable (Table
5).
We were also interested in how well those children who produced critical lures (N = 46; 9
5-year-olds, 17 7-year-olds, 20 11-year-olds) correctly recognized their self-generated critical lure
and whether they were likely to confuse their self-generated critical lure with being part of the
episodic list.  Children across all ages recognized the lure as self-generated and there was a main
effect for age, F(2, 43) = 3.84, p = .029, ?p² = .15.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons of adjacent
age groups indicated that 5-year-olds (M = .88) recognized similar amounts of self-generated lures
as 7-year-olds (M = .69) who recognized fewer lures than 11-year-olds (M = .93, p = .032).
Moreover, source errors (judging the lure as other generated) decreased with age (all ps > .05): 5-
year-olds (M = .44), 7-year-olds (M = .35), and 11-year-olds (M = .30).  Thus, there is no reverse
source-monitoring effect with age in relation to false memories.  However, these source errors
were higher in comparison to Experiment 1 (Table 3 versus Table 5).
Discussion
Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, the novel DRM word-association paradigm
showed that children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates and most importantly, the
number of critical lures spontaneously produced increased significantly with age.  Thus, this novel
paradigm demonstrates that the older children get, the more spontaneously relational information
is accessed in memory.  In addition, the generation of these word associates becomes increasingly
automatic with increasing age, as indicated by the generation-time analyses.  These findings add
to the findings from Experiment 1 and suggest that there are significant increases in the
automaticity with which children access and activate associations in their pre-existing knowledge
base over the primary school period.  However, despite this increase in automaticity, even older
children did not confuse their self-generated lures as being part of the episodic list.  It was
hypothesized that if older children’s false memories are derived from more automatic associative
processes, then the critical lure may become part of the episodic list, something that in turn may
make it increasingly difficult to correctly indicate the source.  However, this was not the case.
Once children produced the critical lure, they were more likely to recognize it and attribute the
source to themselves.  However, overall source errors were higher in comparison to Experiment 1,
which suggests that the self-generation of the critical lure elicits more source confusions than an
implicit associative response to a single word.  It is possible, that source errors increase with
increasing number of presented list items.  That is, here we used a 5-item paradigm and this may
have made it easier for older children to correctly reject information.
Interestingly, when children were questioned about whether the critical lure had been self-
or other-generated, older children were more likely than younger children to correctly identify that
they had generated the lures themselves.  This additional prompting, something that is not typical
in the standard DRM paradigm, may have caused older but not younger children to reflect on the
source of information in their memory.  This finding is consistent with metamemory research
(e.g., Ghetti, 2003) that shows that children who are 8 years of age and older can reflect on and
use source information to edit memory.  Such metamemorial information can be used to correctly
reject items that did not appear on the list only when those items are recognized as having been
self-generated.  Correct rejection of information that has been consciously recognized as self-
generated may occur either because this information gives rise to stronger verbatim
representations of the source of such information (perhaps enabling the use of a recollection-to-
reject strategy; see Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003) or because self-generated
information gives rise to some other memorability-based strategy (e.g., Carneiro, Fernandez, &
Dias, 2009; Ghetti, 2003).
General Discussion
The paradigm developed in the two experiments let children create their own individual
associations, in their own time, and based on their own individual knowledge base.  Whether word
associations were derived from a single word (Experiment 1) or from a list of word associates
(Experiment 2), children’s ability to generate meaningful word associates increased significantly
over the primary school period.  Not only did the number of meaningful word associates that were
produced increase with age, but there was also a reorganization of children’s pre-existing
knowledge with increasing age.  Specifically, in Experiment 1, 11-year-olds responded almost
exclusively with paradigmatic associates in contrast to 5- and 7-year-olds who produced both
syntagmatic and paradigmatic associates.  As Nelson (1977) has noted, the syntagmatic-
paradigmatic shift can be an indication for a reorganization of children’s pre-existing knowledge.
This finding is consistent with studies of memory organization that suggest that the quantity and
quality of associative relations between old and newly acquired concepts continue to undergo
significant changes with development (Bjorklund, 1987, 2005).  As children’s knowledge base
increases, their conceptual representations and the associative links among related concepts
become better integrated in memory (Howe, 2000).  With this in mind, studies exploring
children’s false memory development have created their own word lists based on children’s
aggregated word association norms (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008; Carneiro, et al., 2007; Metzger, et
al., 2008).  Despite using child appropriate lists, and although attenuated, developmental trends in
false memories were still observed.
Theories of the reasons for the increase in children’s false memories with age (e.g., AAT
and FTT) agree that a necessary prerequisite for false memories to occur is a pre-existing lexicon
of associations and the mental activation of this lexicon.  The current research has tried to
empirically operationalize how this pre-existing lexicon of associations unfolds in development
and how the automaticity with which items and associations are activated in this lexicon changes
with age.  The present research adds to the growing answer to these questions.  In particular, we
have shown that the number and type of meaningful associations produced by children increases
and changes significantly with age.  Interestingly, these self-generated associations appear to be
generated outside of conscious awareness because they were significantly less well remembered
than other-generated information (Experiment 1).  What this finding suggests is that self-
generated associates are derived from more automatic processes.  Consistent with this suggestion
is the finding that when presented with a DRM-like paradigm, as age increased, children were
more likely to generate the critical lure spontaneously even when they were not explicitly
instructed to generate an associative response (Experiment 2).  Finally, direct support for the
argument that automaticity of associative activation increases with age can be found across both
experiments.  Specifically, the speed with which children were able to generate meaningful
associations increased significantly as age increased.  Importantly, these increases in automaticity
were observed solely for meaningful responses and not for non-meaningful output.  Thus, it is not
simply an across-the-board change in speed of processing that occurs in children’s knowledge
base with age rather changes are directly related to the additional experience and strengthening of
meaningful relations in children’s associative memory.
That the number of concepts in a child’s knowledge base increases, and that they become
better integrated with existing concepts in memory, is one part (the domain specific part) of the
story concerning the development of memory illusions.  However, according to the current
experiments that it is not the entire story concerning the development of false memories.  The
missing link concerns the domain general increase in children’s speed of processing and its
corresponding impact on the automaticity of memory processes, including associative ones.
There is ample evidence from a vast array of other research domains showing that
children’s task performance improves over the primary school period (e.g., verbal memory, visual
and memory search, mental rotation, mental addition, use of mental imagery) and that all or much
of this improvement can be explained by increased speed of processing (Kail, 1988, 1997; Kail &
Park, 1994).  Indeed, there is no reason to believe that this domain general increase in speed of
processing should not also impact on meaningful associative memory processes in children’s
recollection, making memory search not only faster but also more automatic.  When memory
search becomes more automatic, it produces information more rapidly for retrieval.  However, this
comes at a price, namely, the activation of unpresented but related information.  As automaticity
increases with age over the primary school period, so too does false memory production.
Neurodevelopmental research also supports this domain general notion.  In particular, it
has been suggested that frontal and associative areas of the brain (prefrontal and lateral temporal
areas) are the last to mature, resulting in the late development of higher-order executive and
associative functions (see Craik, 2006, for a review).  Specifically for memory and false memory
development, it has been found that immaturities in the medial temporal lobe and the prefrontal
cortex (left ventrolateral area) can explain age-related differences in false memories (Paz-Alonso,
Ghetti, Donohue, Goodman, & Bunge, 2008).  In contrast, knowledge and memory
representations develop from birth and mature gradually during childhood.  Thus, there are
different neurodevelopmental trajectories associated with changes in cognitive representation and
cognitive control (Craik & Bialystok, 2006).  Altogether, there are three lines of evidence that
support the notion that the increase in false memories with age cannot be solely explained by an
increase in knowledge base: neurodevelopmental research, research that has used child-normed
DRM lists or age-normed associates in a suggestibility paradigm, and the current findings.  What
changes with age is not only how knowledge is organized but also the automaticity with which
this pre-existing knowledge is accessed and activated.
Finally, it is of considerable interest that regardless of age, children were better at
recognizing and identifying the source of information for items that were other-generated than self-
generated items.  Moreover, children’s discrimination between self- and other-generated
information (source-monitoring) increased significantly with age.  Overall, source confusions
were very low, even for the youngest children studied here, the 5-year-olds.  Together, the
findings on source discrimination are consistent with the more general literature on children’s
source monitoring and suggests that even 5-year-old children are already very good at
discriminating between externally- and internally-generated information and actions (e.g., Foley,
et al., 1983; Johnson, et al., 1993).
However, even though source indication was reliable, self-generated information was less
well recognized than other-generated information (Experiment 1).  This latter result shows there is
a memory disadvantage for self-generated events if they are based on implicit associative
processes, something that could increase false memory rates.  This memory disadvantage may
become particularly apparent under conditions in which multiple associates are presented and
where internal implicit associative processing is encouraged, as in a typical DRM paradigm.
Thus, the DRM paradigm, due to its associative nature, elicits a memory disadvantage for the self
in contrast to other paradigms that do not encourage internal implicit associative processing per
se. 
How do the current findings fit into the three theories on the formation of false memories?
As noted above, FTT (Brainerd, et al., 2008) suggests that false memories are a result of gist
extraction mechanisms and children’s false memories increase with age because their ability to
extract the gist from presented information increases.  Gist can be extracted from a single item of
from a number of items.  The findings from both of our experiments are consistent with FTT
inasmuch as they showed that with increasing age, children were more likely to produce
meaningful word associates.  However, with respect to the findings concerning developmental
increases in the automatic activation of associations in children’s knowledge base, FTT does not
make any specific claims.
AMT (Roediger et al., 2001) suggests that false memories are a product of associative
activation processes and of source-monitoring errors.  Specifically, false memories occur because
participants cannot determine the source of the critical lure – whether it has been generated
internally or was part of the episodic list.  Consistent with AMT, the current findings (particularly
Experiment 2) showed that the production of critical lures was more automatic in 11-year-olds
than younger children (i.e., as shown in the generation time analysis).  However, despite greater
automaticity in older than younger children, there were no reverse age trends in children’s source
monitoring ability.  Of course, it is possible that 11-year-old’s false memories are still less
automatic than those of adults and this may be why there was no reverse source-monitoring effect.
Thus, although AMT can explain false memories in adults, it runs into difficulty when trying to
account for developmental increases in false memory rates in childhood.
However, this does not mean that the development of certain metamemorial skills does not
contribute to age changes in false memory.  For example, recent research has demonstrated that
children can use metamemorial information to correctly reject items that did not appear on the list,
but only when those items are recognized as having been self-generated (Ghetti, 2003).
Specifically, children can correctly reject information that has been consciously recognized as self-
generated with the use of a recollection-to-reject strategy (Brainerd, et al., 2003) or with the use of
a memorability-based strategy.  The older children get, the more likely they are to use such
strategies spontaneously (e.g., Carneiro, et al., 2009; Ghetti, 2008).  Thus, there are opposing
processes developing over childhood: ones that can reduce false memories (e.g., recollect-to-
reject, memory editing, source-monitoring, or memorability-based strategy) and ones that can
increase false memories (e.g., reorganization of knowledge, associative processing, and automatic
associative activation).
This distinction is important because it may explain why false memories increase in some
paradigms (e.g., DRM) and decrease in other paradigms (e.g., misinformation) with age.  For
example, whenever the paradigm relies on internally generated semantic processes that occur
outside of conscious awareness, false memory rates tend to increase with age (e.g., in the DRM
task; also see Ceci et al., 2007).  Alternatively, whenever the paradigm relies on semantic
processes whose generated contents are subject to conscious awareness, false memory rates tend
to decrease with age as consciously controlled strategies (e.g., source-monitoring, memory editing
strategies) can be used to edit memory outputs.  Such speculation is also consistent with our
findings concerning the role of the self in memory.  Specifically, what our research has shown is
that the memory advantage typically observed for the self disappears if associative information is
generated automatically outside of conscious awareness.  When information is remembered as self-
generated, memory-editing strategies can be used effectively to “correct” output during retrieval.
That is, in order to correctly reject a memory that is false, memory for self-generated information
may be a prerequisite.
Finally, AAT (Howe et al., 2009b) suggests that children’s false memories are a product of
associative activation processes.  Children’s false memories increase with age both because of
changes in children’s knowledge base (addition of new concepts and semantic relations,
knowledge reorganization) and changes in the automaticity of associative activation.  Altogether,
the current findings fit well with AAT’s claims that age increases in false memory development
involve both domain specific (growth and reorganization of children’s knowledge base) and
domain general (increased automaticity of processing) developments.
The present experiments are a first step toward realizing a more complete theory of the
changes in the content and structure of children’s knowledge base, the age-related changes in the
automaticity of conceptual processing within this knowledge base, and how these factors conjoin
to bring about the development of memory illusions.  We have reintroduced one measurement
tool (in Experiment 1) based on some of Hall’s (1969) earlier work and introduced a new
paradigm (Experiment 2), one based on modifications of the DRM procedure, that can be used to
investigate these developments.  Using these novel procedures, we have been able to conclude
that children’s knowledge base of conceptual representation and the associative connections
among related concepts are present and continue to develop from a very early age.  This
knowledge base of associative relations is domain specific and is gradually refined and changed
with age, changes that are consistent with what we know from recent neurodevelopmental
research and from studies that have used child-normed associative word lists.  In addition, there
are increases in the automaticity with which these concepts are activated, increases that also help
explain the developmental changes in false memory production.  Overall, conditions that
encourage associative processing, such as in a DRM paradigm, can lead to developmental
increases in false memory generation as children’s knowledge representation changes with age
and associative processing becomes increasingly spontaneous and automatic.  It would seem that
the DRM paradigm and its many modifications represents not just a powerful research tool to
study false memory illusions and their development, but also affords us greater insight into
children’s memory organization and the development of automatic processes children use when
activating and accessing mental representations.
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Appendix
Overview of the word lists used in Experiment 2 (taken from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, &
Gallo, 2001).  Total BAS (backward associative strength: likelihood that the list items elicit the
critical lure) and FAS (forward associative strength: likelihood that the critical lure elicits the list
items) values refer to the list items and do not include the BAS or FAS of the strongest associate.
This is because the latter was not presented.  Word Frequency (WF) values obtained from Stuart,
Masterson, Dixon, and Quinlan (1993-1996) for each lure, the strongest associate (in parenthesis
below), and list items are also presented.
|Critical    |Strongest   |List Items  |Total BAS  |Total FAS  |Total WF  |
|Lure        |Associate   |            |           |           |          |
|Black       |White       |Gray        |1.176      |0.15       |1054      |
|(360)       |(441)       |Brown       |           |           |          |
|            |            |Coal        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Dark        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Colour      |           |           |          |
|Car         |Vehicle     |Automobile  |2.516      |0.255      |338       |
|(714)       |(5)         |Garage      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Drive*      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Van         |           |           |          |
|            |            |Keys        |           |           |          |
|Cold        |Hot         |Shiver      |2.737      |0.022      |79        |
|(446)       |(479)       |Arctic      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Frigid      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Freeze      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Chilly      |           |           |          |
|Foot        |Toe         |Ankle**     |1.224      |0.459      |462       |
|(135)       |(14)        |Shoe        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Sandals     |           |           |          |
|            |            |Sock        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Hand        |           |           |          |
|Fruit       |Kiwi        |Citrus      |1.506      |0.147      |119       |
|(133)       |(0)         |Pear        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Berry       |           |           |          |
|            |            |Vegetable   |           |           |          |
|            |            |Banana      |           |           |          |
|Lion        |Roar        |Tamer       |1.206      |0.446      |281       |
|(314)       |(122)       |Tiger       |           |           |          |
|            |            |Mane        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Fierce      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Den         |           |           |          |
|Mountain    |Climber     |Hill        |1.418      |0.428      |546       |
|(173)       |(5)         |Climb       |           |           |          |
|            |            |Molehill    |           |           |          |
|            |            |Peak        |           |           |          |
|            |            |Valley      |           |           |          |
|Shirt       |Blouse      |Sleeves     |1.366      |0.416      |162       |
|(32)        |(3)         |Collar      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Shorts      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Button      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Pants       |           |           |          |
|Sleep       |Nap         |Doze        |2.972      |0.255      |823       |
|(557)       |(14)        |Bed         |           |           |          |
|            |            |Awake       |           |           |          |
|            |            |Snooze      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Slumber     |           |           |          |
|Soft        |Hard        |Loud        |1.353      |0.018      |187       |
|(160)       |(471)       |Tender      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Fluffy      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Pillow      |           |           |          |
|            |            |Downy       |           |           |          |
*The item “sedan” was replaced with the word “drive”, which is more appropriate for British
children.
** The item “inch” was replaced with the word “ankle”, which is more appropriate for children in
this age range.
Footnotes
1 The syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift is also dependent on the grammatical type of a word, where
nouns produce a high-rate of paradigmatic responses but adjectives and verbs produce lower rates.
2 The words were chosen in order to have a variety of non-associated nouns, verbs and adjectives
and so that the strongest associate, according to the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1999) norms,
was associated with the stimulus word on any relational dimension (5 antonyms, 5 entity, 4
situational, 3 synonyms, and 3 taxonomy) according to the Wu and Barsalou (2007) norms (cf.
Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008).  Out of the 20 items, 10 were from the DRM paradigm that fitted
into those criteria - 5 critical lures and 5 strongest backward associates to a critical lure.
Importantly, the words were chosen according to word frequency values of children’s vocabulary
form the Stuart, Masterson, Dixon, and Quinlan’s (1993-1996) word frequency norms that contain
norms of British children’s printed vocabulary over the primary school.
3Each recognition task differed in the individually self-generated words from child to child.
4 When reaction times were analysed separately for the critical lures generated, we found a trend
in the same direction (p = .08).  However, because younger children produced significantly fewer
critical lures than older children (9 5-year-olds; 17 7-year-olds; 20 11-year-olds), the Ns were
skewed and age effects were reduced.
5This is most likely to be a result of older children being more likely to produce the critical lure
beforehand in the production paradigm.  That is, if they produced the critical lure themselves, it
was replaced with the strongest associate as a critical lure in the recognition paradigm.  Thus, at
recognition younger children were presented with more critical lures and fewer strongest
associates whereas older children were presented with fewer critical lures and more, strongest
associates reducing the probability of eliciting a false response for older children.
 Table 1. Children’s syntagmatic and paradigmatic responses as a function of age group (SDs in
parentheses).
|Age Group               |Syntagmatic             |Paradigmatic            |
|5-year-olds             |.39 (.16)               |.59 (.17)               |
|7-year-olds             |.33 (.21)               |.67 (.21)               |
|11-year-olds            |.23 (.14)               |.78 (.12)               |
Table 2. Children’s reaction times (seconds) for generating meaningful word associates as a
function of age group (SDs in parentheses).
|Age Group               |Reaction Time           |
|5-year-olds             |3.40 (1.10)             |
|7-year-olds             |2.51 (.85)              |
|11-year-olds            |1.16 (.45)              |
Table 3.  Children’s source-errors: Mean overestimation of self (items recognized as generated by
themselves that were in reality other generated) and other (items that were recognized as
generated by the other that were in reality generated by themselves) responses (SDs in
parentheses).
|Age Group               |Overestimation Self     |Overestimation Other    |
|5-year-olds             |.17 (.18)               |.2 (.13)                |
|7-year-olds             |.07 (.12)               |.12 (.10)               |
|11-year-olds            |.04 (.05)               |.05 (.05)               |
Table 4.  Reaction times (RT, seconds) for self-generated meaningful and non-meaningful items
(SDs in parentheses).
|Age Group               |RT Meaningful           |RT Non-Meaningful       |
|5-year-olds             |4.11 (2.50)             |6.52 (2.69)             |
|7-year-olds             |3.28 (2.86)             |5.04 (5.86)             |
|11-year-olds            |1.48 (.87)              |4.06 (3.44)             |
Table 5.  Mean correct recognition of self-generated items and source-errors (judging an item as
other-generated) plus mean correct recognition of self-generated lures and source errors (N = 46)
(SDs in parentheses).
|Age Group     |Self-Generated|Source-Errors |Self-Generated|Source-Errors |
|              |Items         |              |Lures (N = 46)|(N = 46)      |
|5-year-olds   |.67 (.16)     |.31 (.24)     |.88 (.19)     |.44 (.31)     |
|7-year-olds   |.76 (.17)     |.18 (.19)     |.69 (.33)     |.35 (.35)     |
|11-year-olds  |.91 (.78)     |.22 (.19)     |.93 (.23)     |.30 (.27)     |
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Children’s mean correct recognition and correct recognition plus attribution for
self- and other-generated items.
Figure 2. Children’s production of the critical lure, strongest associate, related item, and
unrelated item as a function of age.


